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I. ACCOUNTANTS AND THE COURTS
The image of the accounting profession is tarnished states Lee Berton citing
opinion surveys in his article in the July 24, 1991, Wall Street Journal.' A long-
time observer of the accounting profession and a former employee of the Ameri-
can Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), he cites suits by
accounting partners against their own organizations and suits by accounting firms
against defecting partners.2 These add to the already jungle environment including
malpractice suits that in 1990 caused the collapse of the national accounting firm
of Laventhol and Horwath, and speculation on possible demise of others as some
of the national firms merged. Mr. Berton reports that pressure is mounting to
lower fees to keep clients and that almost all major CPA firms are reducing staff.'
KPMG Peat Marwick reportedly cut its partners by 14 % and two other national
firms are dropping at least 5 %.
Starting in the mid 1960's, litigation against accounting firms has increasingly
reflected the public view that auditors are failing to promptly communicate to
owners and investors relevant information concerning business failures and insol-
vencies.4 While the audit fee for a single company may run into several millions of
dollars, the end result is a three paragraph standard report that all auditors copy
1. Lee Berton, The CPA Jungle: Accounting Profession, Once a Staid Field, Is Torn by Incivility, WALL ST. J.,
July 24, 1991, at Al.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. For a detailed chronology see DENZIL Y. CAUSEY, JR., DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
1-60 (4th ed. 1991).
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out of the same book.' It doesn't communicate any of the really important infor-
mation that the reader might want to know. For example, Exhibit I contains a copy
of a then appropriate and proper report (the newer version at note 4 provides rea-
sonable assurance that the financials are free of material misstatement) by a lead-
ing national CPA firm covering financial statements of a savings and loan firm.
The reader of this report might think things were going just fine. However, the
owner's equity section of the balance sheet covered by the same report (also repro-
duced in the exhibit) shows that the savings institution was insolvent, i.e., liabili-
ties exceeded assets so that net worth was negative.
The problem for informative communication is that all auditors copy the same
report out of the same book without any particularized or specific focus on the rel-
ative financial standing, profitability, or financial management and control system
of the audited company. Indeed, considering the level of communication, one
might simply dispense with the report in favor of a statement that the company was
audited. Not surprisingly, much of the litigation against auditing firms involves
claims that the auditors should have communicated more or different information
than that which was presented. In the savings and loan industry, allegations are
sometimes made that auditors failed to disclose (1) loans made to customers with
preexisting loans in default, (2) loans in excess of legal limits, or (3) weaknesses in
controls that permitted the making of loans without proper approval or documen-
tation.6
Auditing standards do permit auditors to modify the standard report if there is
substantial doubt about the entity's ability to continue for one year beyond the date
of the financials.7 However, in practice this standard is not helpful to users since
the modification first appears only when the firm is almost certain to collapse
within a few months. It lacks communicative value in that it is limited to a yes or
no kind of communication without any information as to the ranking in the indus-
try. It is also a difficult standard for auditors to apply since future events are always
5. The latest version of this standard short form report is:
Independent Auditor's Report
We have audited the accompanying balance sheet of X Company as of December 31, 19XX, and the
related statements of income, retained earnings, and cash flows for the year then ended. These financial
statements are the responsibility of the Company's management. Our responsibility is to express an opin-
ion on these financial statements based on our audit.
We conducted our audit in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. Those standards re-
quire that we plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial state-
ments are free of material misstatement. An audit includes examining, on a test basis, evidence
supporting the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements. An audit also includes assessing the
accounting principles used and significant estimates made by management, as well as evaluating the
overall financial presentation. We believe that our audit provides a reasonable basis for our opinion.
In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above present fairly, in all material respects, the
financial position of X Company as of [at] December 31, 19XX, and the results of its operations and its
cash flows for the year then ended in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.
6. See First Nat'l Bank of Sullivan v. Brumleve & Dabbs, 539 N.E.2d 877 (lll. App. Ct. 1989); Seafirst
Corp. v. Jenkins, 644 F. Supp. 1152 (W.D. Wash. 1986).
7. After scores of years of experience with audit reports, the appropriate report for insolvent savings and loan
firms is controversial with some firms contending that a clean opinion as demonstrated above is appropriate.
Consider that many S & Ls have traditionally operated with owner's equity limited to 2 % or 3 % of assets.
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uncertain. There are any number of assumptions or possibilities that make any




Excerpt from Audited Financial Statement of




Capital stock, at stated value, 15,000,000 shares
authorized, 10,383,682 and 10,061,657 shares
issued and outstanding 250 250
Additional paid in capital 11,235 10,333
Undivided profits (deficit) (40,116) 8,318
Total stockholders' equity (28,631) 18,901
REPORT OF INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
To Commonwealth Savings Association:
We have examined the consolidated statements of financial condition of Com-
monwealth Savings Association (a Texas corporation) and subsidiaries as of June
30, 1987 and 1986, and the related consolidated statements of operations, stock-
holders' equity and changes in financial position for each of the three years in the
period ended June 30, 1987. Our examinations were made in accordance with gen-
erally accepted auditing standards and, accordingly, included such tests of the ac-
counting records and such other auditing procedures as we considered necessary in
the circumstances.
In our opinion, the consolidated financial statements referred to above present
fairly the financial position of Commonwealth Savings Association and subsidiaries
as of June 30, 1987 and 1986, and the results of their operations and changes in their
financial position for each of the three years in the period ended June 30, 1987, in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles applied on a consistent ba-
sis.
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A. Three Levels ofAssurance
Accountants have devised three levels of assurance expressed by three distinct
types of reports. An audit report provides the highest possible level of assurance; it
provides reasonable assurance that the financial statements are not materially mis-
stated, especially by management fraud. Rather than state the financials are accu-
rate, the report indicated the financials "fairly present" the results. This gives
recognition to the fact that it is not possible to portray with certainty the results of a
vast number of financial transactions prior to the final dissolution and winding up
of a business. An audit is not a guarantee nor an insurance policy that one or more
accounts are accurate.
The second level of service is a review report which is designed to provide lim-
ited assurance. It is less assurance than an audit because it does not include obser-
vation of physical inventories nor confirmation with parties outside the client
organization such as attorneys, customers, and banks. It is stated in terms of nega-
tive assurance. 8
The third level of assurance is a compilation report which provides no assur-
ance.' This report states that it is limited to information supplied by the client.
B. The Role of GAAS and GA GAS
Each of the three levels of reports-audits, reviews and compilations are pre-
pared according to established standards. Audits are conducted in accordance with
"generally accepted auditing standards" (GAAS). GAAS are established by
AICPA members who are appointed to the AICPA's Auditing Standards Board. In
the governmental sector the General Accounting Office (GAO) has added to au-
diting standards a layer of Generally Accepted Governmental Auditing Standards
(GAGAS). This involves an attempt to make reports more informative by requir-
ing the reporting of additional information, e.g., compliance with laws and regu-
lations and adequacy of internal control structure. The result has been disastrous.
Governmental agencies checking such reports sometimes count such reports
rather than read them. The boiler-plate is so repetitious that auditors themselves
sometimes issue the wrong reports confusing some with others.
Certainly the most relevant information for readers of audit reports concerning
commercial enterprises would be the relative standing of the company in the in-
dustry in terms of financial strength and earnings. While auditors are required to
evaluate such information, no results are reported. There is little hope for effective
audit communications in the government sector until the boiler-plated multiple re-
8. In Joel v. Weber, 569 N.Y.S.2d 955 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991), the plaintiff, a successful artist and composer
known professionally as -Billy Joel," sued an accountant on claims of fraud and aiding and abetting fraud. Id.
-Review reports" contained a note discussing the use of a cost basis to approximate the current market value of
certain assets, and the court, in reinstating the claims, declared this note "cannot be classified as a disclaimer"
because it "conveys the unequivocal impression that it is a good faith attempt to approximate current market
value." Id. at 960 n.3.
9. In Ris v. Finkle, 561 N.Y.S.2d 499 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989), the court held there can be no reliance on com-
piled statements.
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ports can be replaced with a single concise narrative. Boiler-plate should be incor-
porated, if at all, by reference and thereby avoid the repetition that characterizes
current practice.
C. The Role of GAAP
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles or GAAP is the body of rules that
govern current accounting methods and procedures. The problem with GAAP is a
historic one that dates back to the appointment in 1932 of George 0. May to chair a
committee of the American Institute of Accountants (now the AICPA) on devel-
opment of accounting principles. The committee deplored a binding set of rules
and advocated freedom for every corporation to choose its own methods of ac-
counting provided such rules were consistently applied. Assuming such a principle
was workable at the time it was adopted, it is hardly appropriate for today's world
where comparative information is vital to the efficient allocation of resources. The
ghost of George 0. May is still alive. Corporations remain free to choose diverse
methods of accounting for such pervasive matters as inventory and plant and
equipment. In order to eliminate the credibility gap for financial statements it will
be necessary to eliminate this diversity."0 Had George 0. May deplored diversity,
many of today's problems would have been solved years ago.
D. Crises at Accounting Firms
The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona11 brought
much more competition to accounting practice. Firms that were returning as audi-
tors year after year now found themselves required to make proposals in competi-
tion with other firms. The resulting decline in revenues coupled with three
decades of lawsuits expressing public dissatisfaction with auditors' communica-
tion and performance has tarnished the professional image and caused accounting
firms to operate in a jungle-like atmosphere.
The standard approach for dealing with crisis at accounting firms has been
down-sizing. The economics of the firm is simply based on billing out staff at a
multiple of cost. Firing staff and/or partners has been a device used to retain the
best part of the pie (client revenues), but to reduce costs by reducing the number of
those who will share in it. At first, the firm of Laventhol and Horwath announced
down-sizing in response to some $20 million of uninsured losses. 2 However, in
10. There are two classes of GAAP- one for state and local government entities and a parallel one for nongov-
ernmental entities. Nongovernmental entities are bound by "official GAAP" which include pronouncements and
interpretations of the Financial Accounting Standards Board and its predecessor organizations. Given a few more
years, the complexity will make the Internal Revenue Code seem simple and it will be comprised of more pages
than New York telephone books. Despite this complexity, there are still no rules on simple issues like depreciation
and inventories.
11. 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (attorneys could not be denied the right to advertise fixed fees for legal services). See
also In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982), where the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the discipline of a St. Louis
attorney for using direct-mail advertising.
12. WALL ST. J., May 11, 1990. Florida's prohibition on competitive bids by accounting firms was struck
down by the court in Florida Dep't of Professional Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy v. Rampell, 60 U.S.L.W.
2269 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 1991) (No. 89-2668).
[Vol. 12:7
THEACCOUNTING PROFESSION IN THE COURTS
November of 1990 it became the first national accounting firm to announce that it
was filing for bankruptcy.
By use of the down-sizing technique the persons and firms guilty of the most
egregious conduct have often been able to survive the consequences of their
wrongs with no adverse consequences. The down-sizing seldom involves demo-
tion or termination of the most powerful who often are those most responsible for
the substandard performance. For the first time a relatively new approach by the
California State Board of Accountancy offers hope of reversing this trend. The
California State Board is now identifying those particular individuals responsible
for misdeeds and seeing that they are appropriately disciplined. This approach is
so new that it is too soon to tell if it will have any impact on other state boards or
upon the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or AICPA which have done
little (with the important exception of isolated cases) to eliminate individuals
guilty of egregious conduct from the profession or from the particular firm.
It has been widely assumed that various offices of national accounting firms
represent uniform operations in terms of philosophy, goals, qualitative standards
and working conditions. Nothing could be further from the truth. The only simi-
larity between some offices in some national firms is the use of a common logo
and a similar method for numbering audit working papers. Some offices are oper-
ated as the sole property of the partner in charge with no democratic processes or
other checks and balances to avoid the consequences of greed and exploitation of
staff.
E. Reactions of the Profession
The accounting profession, as represented by the AICPA, has been unable to
ignore the clear public message that something must be done. The approach it has
taken has been to strengthen the education and continuing education requirements
for CPAs and to provide required quality reviews for accounting firms.
The AICPA approach has been ineffective because the problems of auditor's in-
dependence, absence of democratic processes in the management of accounting
firms, and greed of those in power are not the matters addressed by increased edu-
cation or quality reviews. Independence of auditors is inherently weak since each
client hires, compensates, and fires its own auditors at will. This inherent weak-
ness is calculated to cause an audit failure at the most critical time - when the audit
client is passing into insolvency. A going-concern modification in the audit report
can become a self-fulfilling prophecy by causing the demise of the client. Both the
AICPA and SEC have resisted demands to require hiring and firing of auditors for
publicly held companies by a committee of outside members of the board of direc-
tors.
Consider the auditor that hires the daughter of the Savings and Loan CEO (to
work on other audits) while the same S & L client hires the managing partner's son
as a marketing executive. This is considered appropriate under current SEC and
AICPA standards. Consider also that a large bank's auditor leases one floor of the
bank (its major client) for its offices. The fact that this compromise of indepen-
1991l
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dence, giving the auditor and client a commonality of interest in the real estate,
goes unchallenged by the state board of accountancy (located in the same city) or
by the quality review process, indicates that the profession is missing the mark in
terms of addressing the cause of the problem.
E Public Policy Issues
The public policy interest in the internal management of accounting firms de-
rives from the federal securities laws which require an annual audit of public com-
panies .13 In contrast, non-public companies remain virtually unregulated in terms
of financial reporting. Having mandated that audits be performed to protect the
public, the public has an interest in how the audit is performed and who performs
it.
The Congress has been asking about the role of the auditor during the savings
and loan crisis and the answer provided by the General Accounting Office is that
auditors have performed poorly. Exhibit 2 is a summary of GAO evaluation of au-
ditors in a report published in 1989.4
G. Judicial Directions
The surge of litigation against accountants in the mid- 1960's brought considera-
ble shifting of position by the courts on the scope of an accountant's duty to third
parties who necessarily rely on the accountant's reports. At first it appeared that
the wall of privity would fall when dicta in an onslaught of court opinions saw the
role of auditors as insurers and the role of courts imposing liability as spreading the
insured risk."5 Since the courts had never confused the role of lawyers or physi-
cians with insurers, the future of the accounting profession was then in doubt."
However, tort reforms in the mid- 1980's leveled the playing field so that only a few
13. Municipalities which receive significant federal aid are required to have audits by independent account-
ants. Other audits are required by contract, e.g., TVA requires its distributors of electric power to have audits by
independent accountants.
14. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CPA AUDIT QUALITY: FAILURES OF CPA AUDITS TO
IDENTIFY AND REPORT SIGNIFICANT SAVINGS AND LOAN PROBLEMS, GAO-AFMD-89-45 (February 1989); see
also UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BANK FAILURES, GAO/AFMD- 89-25 (ASI 26111-61)
(May 1989); UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THRIFT FAILURES, GAO/AFMD-89-62 (ASI
26111-62) (June 1989).
15. Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968). This court said:
Why should an innocent reliant party be forced to carry the weighty burden of an accountant's profes-
sional malpractice? Isn't the risk of loss more easily distributed and fairly spread by imposing it on the
accounting profession, which can pass the cost of insuring against the risk onto its customers, who can in
turn pass the cost onto the entire consuming public?
Id. at91.
16. Denzil Y. Causey, Jr., Accountants'Liability in an Indeterminate Amount for an Indeterminate Time to an
Indeterminate Class: An Analysis ofTouche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 57 Miss. L.J. 379 (1987);
R. James Gormley, The Foreseen, The Foreseeable, and Beyond-Accountants' Liability to Nonclients, 14 SETON
HALL L. REV. 528 (1984); William L. Prosser, Misrepresentation and Third Persons, 19 VAND. L. REV. 231
(1966).
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Exhibit 2
Exhibit 2
Summary of the GAO Report
1. Internal Control Weaknesses
Internal control weaknesses were not identified or reported.
2. Departure from GAAP
Departures from GAAP were not noted or disclosed.
3. Working Papers and Specialists
Working papers were insufficient, and auditors failed to employ indepen-
dent appraisers.
4. Engagement Planning
Auditors failed to follow up on previously identified management deficien-
cies.
5. Knowledge, Training and Proficiency
Auditors failed to comprehend risks in raw-land loans and in 100% fi-
nanced acquisition, development, and construction (ADC) projects.
6. Going Concern
Insolvencies were not timely reported.
jurisdictions now hold accountants liable for negligence to third parties without
some nexus to substitute for the client relationship.17 Most U.S. jurisdictions now
reject the notion of accountant's liability without fault or impose liability without
proof of reliance.18
1. Negligence and Fraud Standards
In defining negligence and the standard of care, the courts have consistently
held that professional pronouncements and the opinions of experts are not conclu-
sive so that the jury may evaluate for itself whether the duty of due care was met in
17. See infra notes 55-88 and accompanying text; see also Joel v. Weber, 569 N.Y.S.2d 955 (N.Y. App. Div.
1991) (court equated the relationship with privity where plaintiffs financial advisor selected the accountant who
was paid with plaintiffs funds); Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969) (accountant sued a newly formed
corporation for his fee, and then unsuccessfully defended the counterclaim for negligent performance on the basis
that no duty of care was owed to the corporation).
18. There are notable exceptions. In Wisconsin it is unnecessary to prove reliance in a suit for negligent mis-
representation. See Imark Indus. v. Arthur Young & Co., 414 N.W.2d 57, 64-65 (Wis. App. Ct. 1987), modified
on other grounds, 436 N.W.2d 311 (Wis. 1989).
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a particular factual setting. It is now well settled that compliance with GAAP is
not a conclusive defense to negligence, civil fraud or criminal fraud.19
Virtually all jurisdictions, except Alabama, hold accountants liable to third par-
ties damaged by reliance on intentional or grossly negligent misrepresentations. In
defining fraud for this purpose the courts have held that the accountant's good faith
interpretation of ethical rules is no defense2" and that knowing misrepresentations
are actionable.21
2. Federal Securities Laws
The federal securities laws early proved a viable remedy where accountants
aided in the sale of fraudulent securities by knowingly misrepresenting financial
condition or earnings22 or recklessly drafted tax shelter opinion letters presented to
prospective investors.23 Several important precedents now limit most federal secu-
rities laws to situations actionable under common law.24 The exception is for mis-
representations concerning new offerings of securities registered under the
Securities Act of 1933. The "due diligence" defense required to avoid liability un-
der this law has been compared to a negligence standard.2" This law, however, af-
fects only relatively large new issues of securities generally involving work by
national accounting firms.
19. United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978) (auditors con-
victed upon charge that deviations from GAAP or GAAS was evidence but not conclusive as to guilt); United
States v. Simon, 425 E2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970) (criminal conviction of audi-
tors affirmed upon instruction that compliance with generally accepted standards was persuasive but not neces-
sarily conclusive as a defense); Maduff Mortgage Corp. v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 779 P.2d 1083, 1086 (Or.
Ct. App. 1989) (professional standards only evidentiary in a civil case; required standard was question of fact for
the jury); see also Thayer v. Hicks, 793 P.2d 784 (Mont. 1990) (erroneous instruction that violation of GAAP
and GAAS was negligence as a matter of law was ruled harmless error; the court concluded the same verdict
would have resulted from a proper instruction that failure to apply GAAP and GAAS is merely evidence of negli-
gence).
20. E.g., United States Nat'l Bank of Oregon v. Fought, 612 P.2d 754 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (the appellate court
reversed the trial court's ruling that the CPA was not liable for fraud because of subjective good faith); Cosgrove
v. Grimes, 774 S.W2d 662, 665 (Tex. 1989) (the trial court erred by instructing the jury that subjective good
faith was a defense to an attorney's negligence. The Supreme Court of Texas declared: "To the extent that some
Texas courts have recognized an exception to attorney negligence based on the subjective good faith of the attor-
ney, those cases are disapproved.")
The AICPA Tax Executive Committee has approved SRTP Interpretation 1-1, "Realistic Possibility Stand-
ard." The standard requires "good faith" positions to have a realistic possibility of being sustained administra-
tively or on the merits. It does not agree with IRS Notice 90-20 or IRS temporary regulations which require a one
chance in three or greater possibility to avoid the $250 preparer penalty for unrealistic positions.
But see Cheek v. United States, Ill S. Ct. 604 (1991) (the Supreme Court held that a taxpayer who in good
faith does not believe he is violating the tax law cannot be held criminally liable regardless of whether the belief is
objectively reasonable. However, good faith cannot be based on constitutional arguments). The Cheek rule does
not necessarily apply in civil cases.
21. Hall v. Edge, 782 P.2d 122 (Okla. 1989).
22. Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976).
23. Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982).
24. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (civil recovery under section 10(b) conditioned upon
proof of intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud); Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988) (in absence of solicita-
tion of sales of securities, accountants cannot be held liable under section 12(1) of the Securities Act of 1933).
25. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 208.
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3. Tort Reforms
Accountants are now finding solace in defenses of statutes of limitation, com-
parative negligence, or contributory negligence, and indications are that some
negligent accountants may bear little financial responsibility for the savings and
loan crisis. This is because of problems of proof and technicalities in some com-
parative negligence laws which deny all recovery unless the plaintiffs negligence
is less than defendant's negligence.26
4. Policy Decisions
An important role of the courts has been to chart the limits of proper conduct of
professional accounting practice. For example, the courts have held that it is im-
proper for accountants to (1) receive undisclosed commissions,27 (2) fail to pro-
vide detailed accounting for the receipt of client funds,28 (3) disclose confidential
client information,29 (4) make proprietary use of client information,3" (5) fail to
advise of savings in professional fees by disclaiming an interest in an estate,31 (6)
withhold client records to enforce accounting fees,32 (7) recommend an invest-
ment in an entity controlled by the accountant,33 (8) prepare un-filed joint returns
without advising of a potential conflict of interest, 4 (9) advise both father and
daughter concerning the father's will,35 or (10) fail to withdraw an audit report
upon learning of errors.36
26. University Natl Bank v. Ernst & Whinney, 773 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (jury found both the
bank and its auditor negligent prorating 59% to the bank and 41 % to the auditors. Based on the Texas comparative
negligence rule, the court properly denied any relief to the bank).
27. George Muhlstock & Co. v. American Home Assurance Co., 502 N.Y.S.2d 174 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)
(class action suit settled by returning $180,000 in allegedly undisclosed commissions). But see Huls v. Clifton,
Gunderson & Co., 535 N.E.2d 72 (II1. App. Ct. 1989) (complaint dismissed since there was no showing that
purchase price was excessive and no claim for rescission).
28. Reid v. Silver, 354 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1965); Croisant v. Watrud, 432 P.2d 799 (Or. 1967).
29. Green v. Harry Savin, P.A., 455 So. 2d 494 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (disclosure of husband's informa-
tion to divorcing wife); Roberts v. Chaple, 369 S.E.2d 482 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (voluntary release of informa-
tion to IRS special agent); Wagenheim v. Alexander Grant & Co., 482 N.E.2d 955 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983)
(accounting firm disclosures of client information to another client).
30. Shwayder Chemical Metallurgy Corp. v. Baum, 206 N.W.2d 484 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973) (injunction is-
sued); cf Agra Enterprises v. Brunozzi, 448 A.2d 579 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (recovery denied where accountant
established a competing business).
31. Linck v. Barokas & Martin, 667 P.2d 171 (Alaska 1983).
32. Whitlock v. PKW Supply Co., 269 S.E.2d 36 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) (recovery of $5,000 for refusing to
deliver or file return until fee paid); Ambort v. Tarica, 258 S. E.2d 755 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979) (client could recover
nominal damages for CPA's wrongful withholding of business records); Linebaugh v. Helvig, 615 P.2d 366 (Or.
Ct. App. 1980) (tax preparer had legal duty to return records within reasonable time upon request); cf Thomas
v. Adams, 271 So. 2d 684 (La. Ct. App. 1972) (CPA who furnished one copy of entries not liable for refusing
second copy until fees paid).
33. Russell v. Campbell, 725 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (treble damages under Texas' Deceptive Trade
Practices Act).
34. Parker v. Carnahan, 772 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (wife became liable for husband's unpaid tax
and after divorce lost home to IRS).
35. Hotz v. Minyard, 403 S.E.2d 634 (S.C. 1991) (since advice was in context as lawyer, law firm but not
accounting firm was vicariously liable).
36. Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (intent imputed to accountant who remained silent
after additional information made audit report misleading).
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In performing ajudicial review of the federal appointment of a receiver for Lin-
coln Savings and Loan Association, the court upheld the government's actions but
questioned the failure of the auditor to exercise independent judgment in reporting
the looting:
What it is hoped the accounting profession will learn from this case is that an ac-
countant must not blindly apply accounting conventions without reviewing the
transaction to determine whether it makes any economic sense and without first
finding that the transaction is realistic and has economic substance that would jus-
tify the booking of the transaction that occurred . . . . It seems that the accounting
firm was more concerned with attempts of conscientious regulators to deal with the
savings and loans industry's severe crisis than the "creative accounting" of its "high
flying" client . . . . Atchison, who was in charge of the Arthur Young audit of Lin-
coln, left Arthur Young to assume a high paying position with Lincoln. This cer-
tainly raises questions about Arthur Young's independence. Here a person in charge
of the Lincoln audit resigned from the accounting firm and immediately became an
employee of Lincoln. This practice of "changing sides" should be examined by the
accounting profession's standard setting authorities as to the impact such a practice
has on an accountant's independence. It would seem that some "cooling off period"
perhaps, one to two years, would not be unreasonable before a senior official on an
audit can be employed by the client."
Over the last three decades the courts have established a number of disclosure
rules. For example, the looting of a corporation by its chief executive officer must
be disclosed by an audit report. 8 Audit reports must disclose that (1) the auditor
hopes to recover past due fees from the proceeds of the new issue of securities,"
(2) the particular period for operations was selected to give a favorable impression
of overall unfavorable operations,a" (3) amounts included in sales or earnings are
from transactions not yet consummated,41 or (4) the client is being defrauded by
another of the auditor's clients."
Since an auditor's duty involves evaluating the adequacy of disclosure, the duty
to communicate is broader than the duty to discover.' The duty to discover is lim-
ited by auditing standards while the duty to communicate applies to all material
information known to the auditor. As defined by the U.S. Supreme Court "mate-
rial" includes information which affects the total mix of information and is not lim-
ited to decisive information in buy-or-sell decisions.4
37. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F Supp. 901,913- 21 (D.D.C. 1990).
38. United States v. Simon, 425 F2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970).
39. Summer v. Land & Leisure, Inc., 571 F Supp. 380 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
40. Spectrum Fin. Co. v. Marconsult, 608 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1979); SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301
(9th Cir. 1982); see also American Reserve Corp. v. Grant, 70 B.R. 729 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987) (alleged con-
spiracy to conceal adjustment of loss reserve as prior period adjustment).
41. Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 540 F2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976); Escott v. BarChris
Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
42. Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 545 F. Supp. 1314 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
43. Denzil Y. Causey, Jr., The CPA's Guide to Whistle Blowing, CPA J., Aug. 1988, at 26-37.
44. TSC Indus. Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
[Vol. 12:7
THEACCOUNTING PROFESSION IN THE COURTS
II. THEORIES OF ACCOUNTANT LIABILITY
The theory of liability selected by the plaintiff may have dramatic effects upon
the result of the case. The theory selected affects both the standard of care and the
scope of duty. For an outline which is helpful in sorting this out the reader is re-
ferred to Exhibit 3.4"
Exhibit 3
Theories of Suits Against Accountants
Plaintiff Theory of Recovery Damages
Clients or Third Parties Common-Law Breach of Contract Benefit of Bargain, Out-of-Pocket
Protected under State Law or Negligence Loss, or Rescission
Anyone who Loses after Reliance Common Law Fraud Out-of-Pocket Loss
Anyone Who Loses after Reliance RICO: Pattern of Mail or Triple the Loss plus
Securities Fraud Attorneys Fees
and Costs
Purchasers or Sellers of Fraud under the Out-of-Pocket Loss or
Securities Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rescission
Purchasers who Can Trace their Failure to Exercise Difference between
Acquisition to Securities Due Diligence as to Accuracy Amount Paid and the Value of
Covered in the Registration of Prospectus under § II the Security at Time of Suit
Statement of the Securities Act
Purchaser of Unregistered Absolute Liability under State Out of Pocket Loss or
Securities Blue Sky Laws Rescission
Consumers of the Consumer Protection Possibly Triple
Service Statutes Damages (Depending on
the Jurisdiction)
Note: A common law breach of contract or negligence claim may involve particu-
lar elements, such as breach of fiduciary duty or breach of warranty, that raise the
standard for evaluating the conduct of the defendant.
45. For a discussion of the theories of claims and defenses see infra notes 115-35 and accompanying text.
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The majority of suits against accountants are brought by clients. Depending
upon the jurisdiction and the facts and circumstances, these suits usually take the
form of breach of contract or negligence (malpractice) actions. However, many
other theories of liability are selected by both clients and third parties depending
upon the particular facts and circumstances. Some of the largest verdicts have in-
volved suits under federal securities laws which have tacked on common-law
claims.46 Because of the possibility of recovering treble damages, there have been
a number of suits under the federal Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO),47 state RICO acts, and State Consumer Fraud Acts.'
State claims exceeding $50,000 may be filed in federal courts whenever there is
diversity of citizenship between plaintiff and defendant.49 Suits in federal court in-
volving federal claims may include state claims; federal claims may generally be
brought in state courts 'I Plaintiffs are tempted to engage in forum shopping where
the facts and circumstances permit filing suit in any one of several states. In one
class action suit, the court held that all common law claims were governed by the
law of the forum state. 1
Ill. THE ACCOUNTANT'S STANDARD OF CARE
The legal standard of care is the usual practice by accountants performing simi-
lar services. A Tennessee court provided this definition:
Generally, it is established law throughout this country that an accountant does not
guarantee correct judgment, or even the best professional judgment, but merely rea-
sonable care and competence. The standard of care applicable to the conduct of au-
dits by public accountants is the same as that applied to doctors, lawyers, architects,
46. Fund of Funds v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 545 F Supp. 1314 (S.D. N.Y. 1982) ($80.7 million verdict) (in
order to recover from accountants under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, it is necessary to prove intent to de-
ceive, manipulate or defraud). Despite this heavy burden some plaintiffs prevail. See Sharp v. Coopers & Ly-
brand, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982). Accountants are liable under section II
of the Securities Act on a negligence standard; however, liability extends only to purchasers of the specific securi-
ties covered under the registration statem(Fnt. The leading case on this standard of care is Escott v. BarChris Con-
str. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
47. James v. Meinke, 778 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1978) (court awarded treble damages plus attorneys fees against
an accountant who allegedly recommended a stock investment). In 1989 bank fraud was added to predicate of-
fenses under RICO; even if the fraud occurred prior to the legislation, it supports a RICO claim. See Weiner v.
Napoli, 60 U.S.L.W. 2190 No. 90-3592 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 1991).
48. The courts are split as to whether professionals are liable under consumer fraud statutes. Accountants are
subject to suit in Texas and New Jersey, but Minnesota has rejected the applicability of its law. See Russell v.
Campbell, 725 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (court affirmed treble damages where CPA failed to advise of
conflict of interest in real estate venture); Gilmore v. Berg, 761 F. Supp. 358 (D.N.J. 1991) (refusal to dismiss
Consumer Fraud Act claims against an accountant who prepared a tax shelter forecast); Jenson v. Touche Ross &
Co., 335 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. 1983) (no liability without fault imposed by CFA on auditors in favor of third par-
ties).
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1988).
50. Tafflin v. Levitt, 110 S. Ct. 792 (1990).
51. In Gruber v. Price Waterhouse, 117 F.R.D. 75 (E.D. Pa. 1987), the choice of law problem for the com-
mon law claims was resolved by the court's conclusion that the law of the forum state governed common law
claims of the entire class. See also Guenther v. Cooper Life Sciences, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1437 (N. D. Cal. 1990),
where the court applied Minnesota choice of law rules and concluded that purchasers of stock should be protected
by the law of the state where the purchases took place, i.e., Minnesota.
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engineers and others furnishing skilled services for compensation and that standard
requires reasonable care and competence therein. Accountants owe a legal duty to
their employer to make reports without fraud and a contractual duty to make them
under the terms of the contract with care and caution required by the standards of
their profession. 2
In affirming a judgment for accountants a California court stated:
Accountants have been recognized as "a skilled professional class ...subject
generally to the same rules of liability for negligence in the practice of their profes-
sion as are members of other skilled professions."
As members of a skilled profession they are experts. The duty of experts is well
expressed in Gagne v. Bertran (1954), 43 Cal.2d 481, 489, 275 P.2d 15, 21: "The
services of experts are sought because of their special skill. They have a duty to exer-
cise the ordinary skill and competence of members of their profession, and a failure
to discharge that duty will subject them to liability for negligence. Those who hire
such persons are not justified in expecting infallibility, but can expect only reason-
able care and competence. They purchase service, not insurance."5 3
Courts hold that standards of the AICPA for its members (including ethical
rules) establish minimum standards for all those who practice public accounting
regardless of one's membership.'
Plaintiffs looking for rules governing conflicts of interest barring combined ac-
tivities, e.g., management consulting for audit clients, will find them nonexistent.
Resourceful counsels, however, soon discover that various activities define vari-
ous levels of responsibility that necessarily overlap. For example, in Fischer v.
Kletz, 5 the court held that information coming to the accountants' attention in the
course of their consulting work created a duty with respect to their audit engage-
ment.5 6 In fact, information that auditors learn in an engagement for one client is
binding on the firm in preparing disclosures for another client."
IV. SCOPE OF THE ACCOUNTANT'S DUTY
The scope of the accountant's duty to use due care is limited in most jurisdic-
tions to parties to a contract with the accounting firm plus those with whom there
52. Delmar Vineyard v. Timmons, 486 S.W.2d 914, 920 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972) (citations omitted).
53. Lindner v. Barlow, Davis & Wood, 27 Cal. Rptr. 101, 104 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962) (citations omitted).
54. Diversified Graphics, Ltd. v. Groves, 868 F.2d 293 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding of liability for a "turnkey"
computerized data processing system on failure to meet AICPA MAS practice standards); Rhode Island Hosp.
Trust Nat'l Bank v. Swartz, Bresenoff, Yavner & Jacobs, 455 F.2d 847 (4th Cit. 1972) ("While [AICPA] stand-
ards may not always be the maximum test of liability, certainly they should be deemed the minimum standard by
which liability should be determined"); Stanley L. Bloch, Inc. v. Klein, 258 N.Y.S.2d 501 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965)
(balance sheet on the CPA's professional letterhead was held to be audited since AICPA rules required a state-
ment of any limitation of the CPA's responsibility). The court held that AICPA rules set the standard for the
accounting profession binding nonmembers as well as members. Id.
55. 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
56. Id.
57. Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Lam, 705 F.2d 404 (10th Cir. 1983) (disallowance of Andersen's contingent
claim against bankrupt corporation); Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 567 F2d 225 (2d Cir.
1977) (disqualification of plaintiffs counsel); Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 545 F Supp. 1314
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) ($80.7 million verdict).
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is a nexus approaching a client relationship. The nexus usually required to impose
a duty of care is such that the accountant must know, prior to performance, of
plaintiffs existence and of plaintiffs intended reliance upon the accountants' re-
port for the transactions resulting in loss.
The specific formulation of the nexus essential to impose the duty varies con-
siderably from jurisdiction tojurisdiction. The largest single group ofjurisdictions
follows the Restatement of Torts formulation at section 552:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any
other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for
the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecu-
niary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails
to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the infor-
mation.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection (1) is lim-
ited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and guid-
ance he intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient intends to sup-
ply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the information to in-
fluence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar transac-
tion. 18
Restatement jurisdictions include Alaska,5 9 Canada, 60 Florida,61 Georgia,62 Ha-
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
59. Selden v. Burnett, 754 P.2d 256 (Alaska 1988) (summary judgment was entered against an investor who
obtained the accountant's investment advice secondhand). The ambiguity in the Restatement (Second) of Torts
where liability is predicated first on intent and then on mere knowledge was resolved by rejecting liability for
knowledge in the private, as opposed to public, capacity.
60. Haig v. Bamford, Wicken & Gibson, 72 D.L.R.3d 68 (Can. 1976). Chartered accountants were held lia-
ble for negligence where they knew the audited financials would be used to raise equity capital but did not know
the identity of the particular investor. Id. The class of persons was sufficiently small and limited because it was
unlawful for the private company to offer securities to the general public. Id. at 76.
61. First Florida Bank v. Max Mitchell & Co., 558 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1990) (Florida Supreme Court adopted the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 522 in holding that an accountant, who personally delivered reports to a bank and
asked for a loan on the client's behalf, could be liable to the bank for negligence).
62. Badische Corp. v. Caylor, 356 S.E.2d 198 (Ga. 1987). The court rejected the plaintiffs argument that
accountants are liable for negligence to an unlimited class of persons whose presence is foreseeable; it limited
negligence liability to "those persons, or the limited class of persons who the professional is actually aware will
rely upon the information he prepared." Id. at 200. This eliminated liability to creditors who alleged the failure to
disclose that various banks had security interests in inventory.
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waii,63 Iowa,64 Kentucky,6" Louisiana, 66 Minnesota, 67 Missouri, 6 New Hamp-
shire,69 New Mexico,70 North Carolina,7 1 Ohio,72 Pennsylvania,73 Tennessee,74
63. Hawaii Corp. v. Crossley, 567 F. Supp. 609 (D. Haw. 1983) (while Hawaii has adopted the Restatement
view of negligence liability, the auditor was not found negligent).
64. Eldred v. McGladrey, Hendrickson & Pullen, 468 N.W.2d 218 (Iowa 1991) (summary judgment for audi-
tor was affirmed because there was no proof of reliance and causation as required by section 552 of the Restate-
ment); see also Pahre v. Auditor of State of Iowa, 422 N.W.2d 178 (Iowa 1988) (claim against accountants
dismissed because plaintiff was not within the limited class protected by the Restatement); Ryan v. Kanne, 170
N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969) (preparer of corporate balance sheet owed duty of care to subsequently formed corpo-
ration).
65. Ingram Indus. v. Nowicki, 527 F Supp. 683 (E.D. Ky. 1981) (applying Kentucky law). The court con-
cluded that Kentucky would hold negligent accountants liable'to foreseeable third parties on the basis established
in the Restatement (Second) Torts. Id. The accounting firm's motion to dismiss was denied despite the absence of
allegations that the accounting firm knew of plaintiff's intended reliance. Id. However, the court indicated that at
the trial plaintiff would have to prove foresecability in order to impose liability for negligence. Id. at 684.
66. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Monco Agency, Inc., 911 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1990) (summary judgment
for the auditor was proper despite the furnishing of 50 copies of the audit report). In order to impose liability to a
third party for negligence under the Restatement, the accountant must have "actual knowledge" of the group of
non-clients and of the transaction or a substantially similar transaction. Id.
67. Florenzano v. Olson, 387 N.W.2d 168 (Minn. 1986). The Minnesota Supreme Court declared that in
Bonhiver it adopted section 552 of the Restatement. Id. at 174 n.3.
68. Harbor Ins. Co. v. Essman, 918 F.2d 734 (8th Cir. 1990) (applying Missouri law) (the court affirmed
dismissal of a negligence claim against partners of Alexander Grant & Co. because the plaintiff insurer was not a
known recipient of information or within the limited class of persons that the accountant intended to influence).
69. Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 451 A.2d 1308 (N.H. 1982) (an accounting firm may be held
liable to foreseeable third parties for negligence in preparing unaudited financials).
70. Stotlar v. Hester, 582 P.2d 403,406 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 585 P.2d 324 (N.M. 1978) (ap-
praiser of real estate could be liable to non-client purchaser within limitations of § 552 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts). The court said: "We hold that the New Mexico tort of negligence by words is set forth in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 (1977)." Id. at 406.
71. Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 367 S.E.2d 609 (N.C. 1988). The scope of an
accountant's liability to third parties is best measured by the approach set out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 552 (1977). In order to prove reliance upon an audit report, it is necessary for plaintiffs to demonstrate that they
received the information directly from the audited financial statements (as opposed to summarized infbrmation
from credit reporting services). Upon review of the remand of the third-party beneficiary claim, the North Caro-
lina Appeals Court held that the contract claim presented factual issues. Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Be-
kaert & Holland, 398 S.E.2d 889 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990).
72. BancOhio Nat'l Bank v. Schiesswohl, 515 N.E.2d 997 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986). The appeals court inter-
preted the Ohio Supreme Court's ruling in Haddon View as application of the Restatement standard in upholding a
directed verdict for an accounting firm. Id. at 998. While the auditor was aware that the plaintiff bank was the
largest creditor, there were no communications between plaintiff and the auditor and no evidence that plaintiff
would actually require the financial statements. Id.
73. DiMarco v. Lynch Homes, 583 A.2d 422 (Pa. 1990) (physician who gives erroneous advice to a patient to
the ultimate detriment of a third person, is liable for negligence to the class of third persons whose health is likely
to be threatened).
74. In Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 1991 Tenn. Lexis 510 (Tenn. 1991), the Tennessee Su-
preme Court approved a new trial for plaintiff adopting section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The
court considered its interpretation a middle ground between privity at one end of the continuum and liability to
anyone who might reasonably use the report at the other end. See also Stinson v. Brand, 738 S.W.2d 186 (Tenn.
1987) (holding that attorneys may be held liable to third parties as per the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552
(1977)). The court said: "These principles, of course, would apply to attorneys as well as to land surveyors, ac-
countants, or title companies." Id. at 190.
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Utah,7" Washington,76 and West Virginia.77 Slightly more restrictive than the
group following the Restatement, England,78 Indiana,79 and Maryland8" insist that
in order to impose a duty of care the accountant must know of the specific person
or specific transaction as opposed to the class of persons or transactions.
New York courts have been influential by virtue of the 1931 landmark decision
of Ultramares81 holding that privity or a nexus approaching privity is required to
impose an accountant's duty of care to third parties.82 In its decision of Credit Alli-
ance v. Arthur Andersen & Co. ,83 the New York Court of Appeals affirmed its ear-
lier reasoning in Ultramares and held that:
Before accountants may be held liable in negligence to non-contractual parties
who rely to their detriment on inaccurate financial reports, certain prerequisites
must be satisfied: (1) the accountants must have been aware that the financial re-
ports were to be used for a particular purpose or purposes; (2) in the furtherance of
which a known party or parties was intended to rely; and (3) there must have been
some conduct on the part of the accountants linking them to that party or parties,
which evinces the accountants' understanding of that party or parties' reliance.84
Courts following New York include Idaho and Montana; legislatures adopting a
similar rule by statute include Arkansas, Illinois, and Kansas.
The most liberal courts establish a duty of care to anyone who might rely on the
accountant's reports and include California,85 Minnesota,8" and Oklahoma.87 This
75. Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974). The court embraced the foreseeability rule but
dismissed the negligence suit against the accounting firm, holding that unidentified future purchasers of corpo-
rate shares are an unlimited class whose reliance cannot be reasonably foreseen. Id.
76. Haberman v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 744 P.2d 1032 (Wash. 1987) (adopting the Restate-
ment view which allows negligence actions against professionals who know that plaintiffs will rely on the defend-
ants' representations). The court required a factual determination as to whether attorneys, accountants, and
engineers knew that allegedly false representations concerning feasibility of nuclear power plants would be in-
cluded in the offering documents supplied to bondholders and creditors and have no proprietary interest. Id. at
1070.
77. In its decision of First Nat'l Bank of Bluefield v. Crawford, 386 S.E.2d 310 (W. Va. 1989), the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 (1977) and held that a negligent
accountant could be liable to a bank where the bank informed the accountant that it would need a review report
prior to closing its loan.
78. Caparo Indus. v. Dickman, 1 All E.R. 798 (C.A. 1989) (no negligence liability to shareholders).
79. Toro Co. v. Krouse, Kern & Co., 827 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1987) (no duty of care absent actual knowledge
of particulars).
80. Flaherty v. Weinberg, 492 A.2d 618, 624 (Md. 1985) (attorney retained by mortgagee may be liable to
mortgagor as limited exception for both tort and contract claims).
81. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
82. Id. at 448.
83. 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985).
84. Id.
85. International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 223 Cal. Rptr. 218, 227 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986), review declined, May 26, 1986 (duty owed to classes of persons who could reasonably be recipients of
reports). California law is now in a state of flux. See Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 271 Cal. Rptr. 470 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1990), review granted and opinion superseded, 798 P.2d 1214 (1990).
86. Bonhiver v. Graff, 248 N.W.2d 291, 302 (Minn. 1976) (CPA performing bookkeeping owed a duty of
care to a third party insurance agent wholly unknown to him).
87. Bradford Sec. Processing Serv. v. Plaza Bank & Trust, 653 P.2d 188, 190 (Okla. 1982) (rejecting Ultra-
mares, bond counsel owed duty of care to pledgee of bonds).
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group also includes Wisconsin except it is unnecessary in Wisconsin to prove reli-
ance. 
88
At the conservative end, Colorado89 and Nebraska" courts hold that duty is
strictly limited to contracting parties, while Alabama holds there is no duty with-
out privity and no liability for fraud absent proof that the accountant intended to
influence the plaintiff.91 Virtually all other jurisdictions impose liability on ac-
countants for fraud because accountants profess to speak from knowledge and the
purpose of their reports is to influence third parties who are expected to rely upon
them. 92
New Jersey93 and Mississippi" courts follow a rule unique in Anglo-American
law to those two jurisdictions. They impose a duty of due care to all who receive
their reports directly from the client. The fact that these courts assume that it is
somehow practical for accountants to control the client's distribution of reports
shows the matter is not well understood.
V. DAMAGES
The measurement of damages for common law claims continues to evolve so
that the rules are fluid and subject to change. The ultimate result often depends
upon the theory selected by the plaintiff when evaluated with the theory of the de-
fense.
A. Nominal Damages
Since nominal damages are generally not recoverable where actual damages are
an essential element of the cause of action, nominal damages are generally denied
88. Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W.2d 361 (Wis. 1983) (duty of care owed to users);
Imark Indus. v. Arthur Young & Co., 414 N. W.2d 57, 64-65 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987), modified on other grounds,
436 N.W.2d 311 (Wis. 1989) (reliance not necessary in action for negligent representation).
89. Stephens Indus. v. Haskins & Sells, 438 F2d 357 (10th Cir. 1971) (holding that an auditor, who knows
the purpose of the audit is for the use of a purchaser of the client's corporate stock, has no duty of care to the
purchaser).
90. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Wisner v. Kennedy & Coe, 441 N.W.2d 180 (Neb. 1989) (accounting firm's duty
of due care is limited to clients and in absence of fraud or other facts establishing duty, has no liability to third
parties). The court declared: "We now hold that an accountant's duty of reasonable care is to his client and gener-
ally does not extend to third parties absent fraud or other facts establishing a duty to them." Id. at 182.
91. Colonial Bank v. Ridley & Schweigert, 551 So. 2d 390 (Ala. 1989) (holding that auditor of mortgage com-
pany owed no duty of care to third party creditor for negligence or fraud). The court adopted New York's Credit
Alliance rule and went one step further by holding that an accountant is not liable for fraud in absence of an intent
to influence plaintiff. Id. at 395.
92. In Ultramares v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931), Judge Cardozo, writing for a unanimous court, re-
manded for trial on the issue of fraud despite the fact that plaintiff was unknown to the defendant auditor. Id. In
distinguishing Ultramnares from similar situations where representations are made without knowledge, he said:
"No such charity of construction exonerates accountants who by the very nature of their calling profess to speak
with knowledge when certifying to an agreement between the audit and the entries." Id. at 449.
93. H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983). Allegation of auditor's negligence by purchasers
of stock in a publicly traded corporation stated a valid claim; an auditor has a duty of care to all those who receive
the financial statements directly from the audited entity. Id. at 153.
94. Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 315 (Miss. 1987). All nine Justices con-
curred in dicta establishing auditors' negligence liability to those third parties who suffer a loss as a result of reli-
ance upon a financial statement obtained by the third party directly from the audited entity. Id. at 322-23.
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in tort actions."5 A claim that an auditor breached ethical standards and a fiduciary
duty to disclose the receipt of a commission on the sale of two businesses was dis-
missed where plaintiff was unable to show that the businesses purchased were not
worth their value, and there was no election to rescind the acquisition.96
General damages are presumed without proof of loss upon publication of slan-
der per se. Thus an accountant, who made an error on the client's sales tax return,
recovered $500 when the client reported to a third party that he was a "fucking
thief. 97
B. Future Damages
While some courts have dismissed claims of future damage,98 the evolving rule
is that future damages are recoverable provided they are proved with reasonable
certainty. 99
C. Compensatory Damages
Compensatory damages are the immediate, natural, and anticipated conse-
quences of the wrong. Anticipated consequences in contract actions should result
in a benefit-of-the-bargain rule with foreseeability determined at the time of exe-
cution of the contract.1 00 Foreseeability in tort actions should result in an out-of-
pocket rule with foreseeability determined at the time of the wrong.10 1 Prosser
comments that few courts apply either rule with consistency. 1 02
1. Accounting Fees
Accounting fees paid are compensatory damages that may be recovered if there
is a fundamental breach of contract but not for minor errors or inaccuracies espe-
95. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 110, at 765 (5th ed. 1984) [here-
inafter KEETON]. In Holland v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 571 N.E.2d 777 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), summary judg-
ment for the auditor was upheld due to failure to develop a theory of how financial reports led to decisions or
events that resulted in specific or reasonably certain losses to the client. Id. at 781. The trustee in bankruptcy
could pursue only claims of the estate, and could not recover for claims of individual creditors. Id. at 782-83.
96. Huls v. Clifton, Gunderson & Co., 535 N.E.2d 72 (111. App. Ct. 1988).
97. Dail v. Adamson, 570 N.E.2d 1167, 1168 (111. App. Ct. 1991).
98. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Touche Ross & Co., 452 N.W.2d 746, 749 (Neb. 1990) (dismissal of
claim by insurer for losses that it "will be forced to incur").
99. Some courts routinely permit recovery of future damages. Billings Clinic v. Peat Marwick Main & Co.,
797 P.2d 899, 912 (Mont. 1990) (damages were calculated as the present value of the future interest deferential
caused by the adverse effect of a corporate reorganization). The court declared "the amount of future damages
rests in the sound discretion of the trier of fact and need only be reasonably certain under the evidence." Id. at
914. Greenstein, Logan & Co. v. Burgess Marketing, Inc., 744 S.W.2d 170, 187 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (plaintiff
recovered $3.5 million from the accountants based on the value of a business as measured by the discounted
value of future cash flows); see also J. Marbury Rainer, Recovery of Lost Profit Damages for Business Interruption
or Destruction, 28 GA. ST. B.J. 63 (1991).
100. The time-honored precedent is Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
101. The foundation for the rule is the celebrated case of Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y.
1928).
102. KEETON, supra note 95, at 768.
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cially if substantial value from the work remains. 3 Where the court applies other
measures of damages, there is authority that the unpaid fee for a competent per-
formance should be deducted to avoid a double recovery. 04
2. Interest
The courts are split as to recovery of interest on a claim for underpaid taxes.
Some courts hold that the client had the use of the money so there can be no recov-
ery for interest on underpaid tax."0 ' Other courts permit recovery and reject any




Consequential damages depend upon special circumstances which are not ordi-
narily anticipated. Consequential damages include economic losses, losses to rep-
utation, mental anguish, and expenses reasonably incurred to mitigate damages.
1. Attorney Fees
While the American rule is that parties usually pay their own attorney's fees,
there are an increasing number of exceptions to this rule. The federal courts and
many state courts now impose attorney fees and other penalties upon parties or
their counsel who engage in frivolous litigation.107
A common law exception permits recovery of attorney's fees where the defend-
ant causes attorney fees to be incurred in a dispute with a third party. Where an
103. Board of County Comm'rs v. Baker, 102 P.2d 1006 (Kan. 1940) (judgment for return of entire fee based
on fundamental breach of contract to audit in accordance with specified standards); see also Ryan v. Kanne, 170
N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969) (where the court allowed recovery of the fee despite substantial errors in the report);
Coopers & Lybrand v. Trustees of the Archdiocese of Miami, 536 So. 2d 278, 283 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)
(where the court held the client could recover fees paid as compensatory damages for negligent audits, subject to
the jury's apportionment of fault, 60% to Coopers and 40% to the client).
104. McGlone v. Lacey, 288 E Supp. 662,665 (D.S.D. 1968) (attorney fee for competent performance should
be deducted from damages for defective performance).
105. Bick v. Peat Marwick & Main, 799 P.2d 94, 101 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990) (taxpayer "was not damaged by
payment of tax deficiency and interest accrued because these monies were already owed to the IRS"). In affirm-
ing jury verdict for recovery of negligence penalty of $150,250, the court held the action was not time barred
since assessment of the negligence penalty was essential to the accrual of the cause of action. Id. at 94; Orsini v.
Bratten, 713 P.2d 791 (Alaska 1986) (holding that the plaintiffs were not entitled to interest penalty damages
since they had the use of the underpaid tax monies and presumably were able to earn interest on it). In denying
recovery for interest the court said: "[Playing the interest penalties effectively cost the Brattens nothing." Id. at
794.
106. Wynn v. Estate of Holmes, 815 P.2d 1231 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991). The claim for IRS interest assessed on
underpayment of tax did not accrue until the amount was known. Id. The appeals court affirmed the award of
interest and the denial of any credit for the value of plaintiffs use of the money during the four-and-one-half-year
period. Id. at 1235; see also Dail v. Adamson, 570 N.E.2d 1167, 1168 (111. App. Ct. 1991) (plaintiff recovered
penalty, interest, and 10% of the accounting fee based on evidence that erroneous sales tax returns accounted for
10 % of the work); Slaughter v. Roddie, 249 So. 2d 584 (La. Ct. App. 1971) (recovery of interest was based on a
written guarantee provided by the taxpayer).
107. A Georgia statute permits recovery of attorney's fees when a party (1) acts in bad faith, (2) is stubbornly
litigious, or (3) causes unnecessary litigation and expense where there is no controversy. GA. CODE ANN. § 13-6-
11 (Michie 1984). See also Deloitte Haskins & Sells v. Green, 403 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (Ga. Ct. App. 199 1), the
court sustained a verdict for attorney fees of over $150,000 where the jury could have found there was a contract
for tax advice, and that the accounting firm responded in bad faith by denying it gave any advice.
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accounting firm's error caused the wrong cowboy to be named rodeo champion,
the accounting firm was liable for attorney fees incurred by all parties to the result-
ing dispute.108 Attorney fees in dealing with the IRS caused by defendant's negli-
gence are generally recoverable.1"9 Accountant fees may also be recoverable as




Mental anguish is usually denied in professional malpractice cases because of
the rule that such recovery must be conditioned upon physical injury.11 Missis-
sippi has relaxed this rule and now indicates that recovery is permissible where it
is reasonably foreseeable that the defendant's tax or accounting error could cause
emotional distress, and the plaintiffs resulting condition requires medical treat-
ment. 1 2
3. Losses to Reputation
Defamation claims against accountants generally fail because the accountant's
performance results in either a qualified or absolute privilege. 13 However, a court
in Minnesota awarded $10,000 for loss of reputation to an insurance agent who
claimed damage as a result of representing an insurance company after it was in-
solvent. 114
108. Professional Rodeo Cowboys Ass'n v. Wilch, Smith, & Brock, 589 P.2d 510 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978).
109. Sorenson v. Fio Rito, 413 N.E.2d 47 (Il. App. Ct. 1980) (attorney liable for legal fees to mitigate dam-
ages from attorney's failure to timely file estate tax returns).
110. Slaughter v. Roddie, 249 So. 2d 584 (1971) (return preparer held liable for correcting erroneous work
based on written guarantee of tax return); Stanley L. Bloch, Inc. v. Klein, 258 N.Y.S.2d 501 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1965) (CPA liable for return of fee plus fee for corrected report).
11l. Thomas v. Cleary, 768 P.2d 1090, 1094 (Alaska 1989) (failure to timely file tax return did not reach the
level of outrage); H & R Block v. Testerman, 338 A.2d 48 (Md. 1975) (taxpayers awarded interest, penalties,
legal and accounting costs against return preparer but mental anguish denied because no physical injury);
Folkens v. Hunt, 348 S.E.2d 839 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986) (accountant's accusation of client in front of secretary
was not outrageous so as to permit recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress).
112. Wirtz v. Switzer & Switzer, Ltd., 586 So. 2d 775, 784 (Miss. 1991) (recovery of mental anguish over tax
error denied only due to failure to preserve point on appeal).
113. Ross v. Gallant, Farrow & Co., 551 P.2d 79 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976) (CPA performing an audit had a quali-
fied privilege and in absence of proof of malice was not liable for statement that certain union expenditures were
not authorized); Harper v. Inkster Pub. Sch., 404 N.W.2d 776 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (auditor owes no duty to
employee discharged as a result of audit report); Ward Telecommun. and Computer Serv. v. State of New York,
366 N.E.2d 840 (N.Y. 1977) (audit duties on State Comptroller's Office cloaked with absolute privilege); Angel
v. Ward, 258 S.E.2d 788 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (CPA's letter concerning IRS agent protected by absolute privi-
lege for quasi-judicial proceedings).
114. Bonhiver v. Graff, 248 N.W.2d 291 (Minn. 1976).
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4. Economic Losses
Economic damages are recoverable provided the proof is reasonably certain
and not speculative. " ' The plaintiff must have standing to sue for the particular
economic losses for which recovery is sought. Thus suits by directors 16 or share-
holders" 7 for economic damage to the corporation are dismissed. Limited part-
ners have no standing to sue for losses to the limited partnership. " 8 A trustee in
bankruptcy has no standing to sue an accounting firm for damages to individual
creditors.119
VI. PRACTICE POINTS FOR COUNSEL
Discussion of practice points for counsel in cases involving accountants is sub-
divided as follows:
* Developing the theory of plaintiffs case;
* Developing the defense theory;
* Problems of overly aggressive litigation;
* Presenting expert testimony; and
* Attention to details.
A. Developing Plaintiffs Theory
The job for plaintiffs counsel and plaintiffs litigation support team is to de-
velop the broadest possible scope of alternative theories of recovery and to pre-
cisely develop the theory of damages and expert testimony to match. The theories
selected affect the required proof, available defenses, and the measure of damages.
Consider Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Insurance Co. ,12' the leading
case in Mississippi on accountants' professional responsibility. The plaintiff paid
out $1 million on a blanket fidelity bond after the president looted the bank upon
completion of the auditor's report.121 The theory of the insurer was that the ac-
counting firm's negligence caused it to make an incorrect insuring decision, and
this theory put the insurer in the position of a third party. 122
115. Damages from remaining in a losing business are generally denied as speculative. Drabkin v. Alexander
Grant & Co., 905 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (applying D.C. law) (reversed because of speculative nature of al-
tered conduct); Stanley L. Bloch Inc. v. Klein, 258 N.Y.S.2d 501 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965) (damages from remain-
ing in business too remote, especially where client had other information).
116. Blank v. Kaitz, 216 N.E.2d 110 (Mass. 1966).
117. Meyerson v. Coopers & Lybrand, 448 N.W.2d 129 (Neb. 1989). Shareholders may sue derivatively for a
recovery to their corporation. See Pearl v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 726 F.2d 1075 (6th Cir. 1984).
118. Rothstein v. Seidman & Seidman, 410 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Limited partners can sue deriva-
tively for a recovery by the limited partnership. See Jaffe v. Harris, 312 N.W.2d 381 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
119. Holland v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 571 N.E. 2d 777 (I11. App. Ct. 1991) (the court conceded the theory
of deepening insolvency, but ruled it was too late on motion for summary judgment to say it might be necessary to
hire an expert).
120. 514 So. 2d 315 (Miss. 1987); see also Wirtz v. Switzer & Switzer, Ltd., 586 So. 2d 775 (Miss. 1991) (in
reversing denial of attorney fees as speculative, the Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled that attorney fees in-
curred as a result of the CPA's negligence could be an element of damages).
121. Ross, 514 So. 2d at 315.
122. Id.
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The jury in Touche Ross awarded plaintiff $1 million in actual damages and
$500,000 in punitive damages.123 The Mississippi Supreme Court, however, re-
versed based on an intervening cause: a negligent auditor is not responsible for
damages caused by a subsequent criminal act (theft by the bank president).124 Had
plaintiff sued as subrogee on the theory that unreported weaknesses in internal
control created the high-risk environment that made theft possible, the intervening
cause defense might have been denied.
Dicta in the Touche Ross case established an accountant's duty of due care to all
those who receive reports directly from the client.12 The Mississippi Supreme
Court later extended this liability to indemnity claims by recipients of negligent
professional reports after they pass them to others who incur damage. 126 The court
thus upheld an award requiring a termite inspector to indemnify the seller of a
home on a claim by the buyer. 127
Some courts reach drastically different results depending upon whether the
case is construed to be in contract or tort. Two courts have upheld claims on a
third-party beneficiary theory while denying relief under a tort theory. 28 In New
York, client claims are construed as contract claims subject to the malpractice lim-
itation period, while third-party claims are subject to the tort limitation period.129
In one case the accounting firm was denied ajury instruction on comparative neg-
ligence as to a contract count since the accounting firm owed a contractual duty
regardless of plaintiffs actions."'
Justice is not served by making distinctions between tort and contract where
claims are brought by clients. Certainly the plaintiff suing on a contract claim
should have available all remedies available to those without a contract. If this is
true the corollary would be to extend to defendants all defenses that might apply to
tort claims. In suits by third parties, the contract versus tort distinction should be
maintained to avoid giving a windfall benefit of contract rights to a non-contract-
ing plaintiff.
B. The Accountant's Theory of Defense
The job for defense counsel and the litigation support team is to focus on the
particular aspect that will defeat plaintiffs particular claim. For example, when
the defense was unable to bar the suit based on the statute of limitations, the court
agreed to limit damages to those that accrued within the limitation period.131
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 318-23.
126. See infra note 127.
127. Strickland v. Rossini, 589 So. 2d 1268 (Miss. 1991).
128. Seaboard Surety Co. v. Garrison, Webb & Stanaland, 823 F.2d 434 (11 th Cir. 1987); Raritan River Steel
Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 398 S.E.2d 889 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991).
129. Allied Int'l Bancorp v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 530 N.Y.S.2d 964 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988).
130. Deloitte Haskins & Sells v. Green, 403 S.E.2d 818 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991).
131. Norfolk Iron & Metal Co. v. Behnke, 432 N.W.2d 18 (Neb. 1988) (damages limited to those that accrued
two years prior to filing suit).
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The case of Billings Clinic v. Peat Marwick Main & Co. '32 provides an interest-
ing example of how a plausible defense strategy can go wrong. The case involved
tax advice in a scenario where the accounting defendant gave correct advice.133
Both parties focused on the standard of care with disastrous results for the ac-
counting firm.'34 The plaintiff used a Peat film to establish that the standard of
care for tax advice was to "anticipate and identify problems that the client may not
even be aware of yet."13 A defense focused on proximate cause might have con-
vinced the jury that the loss was caused by two law firms that had direct responsi-
bility for the particular advice that caused the loss.
In the Touche Ross case discussed above under "Plaintiffs Theory," defense
counsel came up with a brilliant defense that completely thwarted plaintiff's recov-
ery despite the jury's finding that the auditor was negligent. Counsel's defense of
intervening superseding cause convinced the Mississippi Supreme Court that a
negligent auditor could not be responsible for criminal acts of the bank president
that occurred after the completion of the audit.' 36 Despite plaintiffs evidence
which showed that the audit partner placed his brother in the position of internal
auditor with the bank, and the jury's finding that the auditor was negligent, the
Mississippi Supreme Court ruled for the auditor. 1
37
1. Comparative Fault
A growing number of court decisions support the view that accountants should
be liable for only their fair share of total liability. However, it is important to distin-
guish allocation between plaintiff and defendant (which is the function of the doc-
trine of comparative fault) from doctrines of contribution and indemnity (which
involve allocation of damages among defendants). Since the bulk of claims against
accountants are brought by clients, the doctrine of comparative fault is rapidly be-
coming an important defense. This theory reached its full development in a Min-
nesota case where the Supreme Court of Minnesota established a standard of care
for plaintiffs: "[P]ersons who hire accountants, usually business persons, should
also be required to conduct their business in a reasonable and prudent manner."'
38
The Minnesota court rejected the notion that the client's negligence may be a de-
fense only if it contributes to the accountant's failure to perform; this places an un-
reasonable burden on accountants of proving that the client's negligence caused
the accountant's negligence.
139
132. 797 P.2d 899 (Mont. 1990).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 906.
136. Ross, 514 So. 2d at 315.
137. Id. The defense of intervening superseding cause has been used to terminate an auditor's liability following
the hiring of a successor auditor. See In re Bell & Beckwith, 50 B.R. 422 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
138. Halla Nursery v. Baumann-Furrie & Co., 454 N.W.2d 905, 909 (Minn. 1990).
139. Id.
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The "reasonable and prudent manner" in which clients must conduct themselves
was limited in a Kansas case.140 The court rejected the tax return preparer's argu-
ment that there can be no recovery against a tax preparer where the taxpayer also
has a duty to detect and prevent the erroneous understatement of tax.141 Two ex-
pert CPAs testified that "the majority of taxpayers merely look at the bottom line
showing the amount due or owing and sign the returns so that preparers cannot
depend upon taxpayers to review their own returns. 
14 2
2. Statutes of Limitation
The defense of the statute of limitations is one of the potentially best of defenses
since it is absolute and avoids the necessity of a trial.I As one moves from state to
state, the limitation periods and court interpretations of them are hopelessly con-
fused. Some jurisdictions have limitation periods as short as one year'" while oth-
ers have limitation periods as long as six years. 45 One can never be sure when the
limitation period starts to run. Perhaps the most likely view is that the limitation
period starts to run on tort claims from the date of discovery, and that the period
starts to run on a contract claim from the date of the breach. Some courts hold that
accountant malpractice claims sound in contract,14 others hold that all such
claims sound in tort; 47 some hold that it depends upon the facts and circum-
stances,"* while still others give plaintiff the choice of remedies.' 49 There is still
more confusion as to when such claims accrue so as to start the running of the limi-
tation period. 50 A number of jurisdictions have defined situations that toll the
140. Bick v. Peat Marwick & Main, 799 P.2d 94 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990) (accountant liable for negligence pen-
alty of $170,250).
141.Id. at 98.
142. Id. at 103.
143. The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense and the failure to call it up for hearing prior to trial
results in a waiver. See Bradford-White Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 872 F.2d 1153 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 993 (1989).
144. Louisiana has a one-year statute of limitations for tort actions that starts to run upon discovery. See Har-
vey v. Dixie Graphics, 580 So. 2d 518 (La. Ct. App. 1991), affd, 593 So. 2d 351 (La. 1992). Neither lack of
facts as to full damage nor negotiations with the IRS tolls the running of the limitation period. The court rejected
the policy argument that plaintiff would be required to sue the tax return preparer while at the same time defend-
ing the return in IRS proceedings. See also Carey v. Pannell, Kerr, Foster, CPAs, 559 So. 2d 867 (La. Ct. App.
1990).
145. An action against accountants by a contracting party is in contract and subject to a six-year limitation per-
iod. See Allied Int'l Bancorp v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 530 N.Y.S.2d 964 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988).
146. Brueck v. Krings, 638 P.2d 904 (Kan. 1982).
147. Sato v. Van Denburgh, 599 P.2d 181 (Ariz. 1979).
148. Where an accounting firm expressly undertakes to use due care, it is liable to the client for negligent audit-
ing in either tort or contract so that a claim was not time-barred under the six-year limitation period for contract
claims. See Blumberg v. Touche Ross & Co., 514 So. 2d 922 (Ala. 1987).
149. Heyer v. Flaig, 449 P.2d 161 (Cal. 1969).
150. Philip v. Giles, 620 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981) (suit against an attorney for incorrect tax advice was
dismissed). Since the IRS had never ruled on the matter, the court held the claim was premature. Id. See also
Thomas v. Cleary, 768 P.2d 1090 (Alaska 1989) (judgment vacated against an accounting firm for malpractice
because the return had never been filed, and the IRS had never assessed taxes although it could still do so); Bron-
stein v. Kalcheim & Kalcheim, Ltd., 414 N.E.2d 96 (Il. App. Ct. 1980) (taxes were assessed after attorneys
promised no taxes, but the claim was dismissed because the matter was still pending in Tax Court).
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running of the limitation period such as concealment,'15 continuing of the profes-
sional relationship, 5 2 or assurances by the accountant that ultimately no losses
will be incurred."5 3
C. Overly Aggressive Litigation
Courts are increasingly imposing sanctions on overly litigious parties. While
accountants have often complained of strike suits, they have more recently felt the
sting of sanctions for their own misconduct related to litigation against them.
Sanctions have included the denial of a defense, 5 4 award of costs and expenses, 5 5
as well as payment of plaintiffs attorneys fees.156 Counsel should carefully con-
sider the viability of any claim or defense while respecting the increasing tendency
of courts to impose sanctions, especially federal courts imposing Rule 11.157
D. Presenting Expert Testimony
Expert testimony is usually critical to success for both plaintiff and defendant.
It is essential for counsel to plan and present the expert testimony as to the standard
of care and damages with the utmost precision or the entire case will fail.
1. Standard of Care
Experts must testify as to the standard of care and state unequivocally that the
defendant failed to follow the standard.5 8 Testimony is based either on a hypothet-
151. The statute of limitations started running from the time of the breach of contract to prepare and timely file
a tax return, but the statute was tolled by concealment until plaintiff learned that the tax return had not been filed.
See L.B. Lab. v. Mitchell, 244 P.2d 385 (Cal. 1952).
152. New York courts hold that the "continuous representation rule" (continuous treatment rule in medical mal-
practice) tolls the statute of limitations as long as the professional is retained in connection with the matter involv-
ing alleged malpractice. See Glamm v. Allen, 439 N.E.2d 390 (N.Y. 1982) (continuous representation rule
tolled the statute as long as attorney continued to represent plaintiff).
153. Wynn v. Estate of Holmes, 815 P.2d 1231 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the accountant's assurances
throughout negotiations with the IRS that plaintiffs would likely suffer no loss tolled the statute of limitations).
The claim for IRS interest assessed on underpayment of tax did not accrue until the amount was known. Id. at
1234. See also Harvey v. Dixie Graphics, Inc., 580 So. 2d 518 (La. Ct. App. 1991), affd, 593 So. 2d 351 (La.
1992), where the statute of limitations started to run when the taxpayer became aware that the tax return pre-
pared by Touche Ross was subject to dispute, and assurances by the accounting firm did not bar the running of the
limitation period.
154. In Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Costa County Super. Ct., 245 Cal. Rptr. 873 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988),
the California Commissioner of Corporations sued Peat following the failure of a thrift and loan corporation. The
trial court's sanctions precluding Peat from introducing testimony on the standard of care were upheld based on
evidence that Hurdman's role as plaintiffs expert may have been revealed when Peat merged with Hurdman. Id.
at 882-85.
155. State of Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 570 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1978) (preclusionary sanctions and an
award of $59,949 costs and expenses because of Andersen's alleged unreasonable resistance to discovery).
156. Deloitte Haskins & Sells v. Green, 403 S.E.2d 818, 820-21 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (the court upheld an
award of attorney fees of $155,501.20 to plaintiff based on evidence that the accounting firm had a duty to give
advice and that it responded in bad faith by claiming that it gave no advice).
157. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990).
158. Lentino v. Fringe Employee Plans, Inc., 611 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying Pennsylvania law); Kirsch
v. Duryea, 578 P.2d 935 (Cal. 1978); Halvorson v. Sooy, 782 P.2d 161 (Or. Ct. App. 1989); Kemmerlin v.
Wingate, 261 S.E.2d 50 (S.C. 1979); Seaward Int'l v. Price Waterhouse, 391 S.E.2d 283 (Va. 1990).
1991]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA WREVIEW
ical or on familiarity with the proved facts. In Halvorson v. Sooyl5 9 the claim was
dismissed after the following testimony was inconclusive:
Q. All right. And with regard to the shared appreciation mortgage and his advice to
enter into that do you have an opinion as to whether or not he should have researched
that issue before giving any advice?
A. Well, I don't know whether he researched it or not. His work files would indicate
that he didn't. But if he would have researched it and communicated it maybe the
advice wouldn't have been given, and that's my opinion.
Q. All right.
A. That I would not have given that advice.' 
60
In dismissing the case the court said:
The testimony, read as a whole, only expresses the witness's opinion that the advice
should have been in writing, that, if the "shared appreciation mortgage" had been
researched, the advice might not have been given and that the witness would not
have given the advice that the defendant gave. The fact that the advice was not in
writing does not mean that it fell below the standard of care for CPAs. The facts that
defendant should have researched the "shared appreciation mortgage" and that he
might have given different advice had he done so is not evidence that defendant
would or should have given different advice. Finally, the fact that the witness would
have given different advice is not evidence that defendant's conduct fell below the
standard of care. The trial court properly dismissed the complaint. 161
Consider the case of Seaward International v. Price Waterhouse, 62 where Price
Waterhouse (PW) was engaged to audit fiscal year ending July 31, 1983.63 The
controller represented to PW that the firm met the test for a qualified DISC (relat-
ing to a former tax rule) and furnished backup information to PW.'64 PW's field
work revealed no reason to dispute the assertion.16 In April, 1985, the IRS deter-
mined that the requirements had not been met.166 When the client sued PW, the
court set aside the jury verdict for plaintiff due to failure of expert testimony and
the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. 67 The trial judge summarized the failure
this way:
The alleged negligence of [PW] is that the auditors failed to look at the backup
material, but merely accepted Mr. Bryan's representation that the DISC met the
test . . . . [W]hat would [PW] have discovered if they had looked as Seaward says
they should have looked? In an effort to answer that question, . . . Seaward says in
its brief that [PW] would have found that the DISC had insufficient qualified export
159. Halvorson, 782 P.2d at 164.
160. Id.
16t. Id.
162. 391 S.E.2d 283 (Va. 1990).
163. Id. at 284.
164. Id. at 285.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 286.
167. Id.
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assets to meet the test for its fiscal year ending in 1983 . . . . But [Seaward] failed
to prove that.
I kept waiting for the evidence . . . and it's very, very direct and very sim-
ple . . . it would have taken half an hour to prove. Witness one gets on the stand: "I
am familiar with the records of Seaward as of. . . whatever day you want to say is
the day or dates on which [PW] should have looked and should have found . . . here
they are."
Witness two, an expert, gets on the stand and says: "I have reviewed this pile of
records . . . and I can say . . . that a competent auditor . . . should have looked at
these records and, if they had looked at these records, would have found that the
DISC was not going to qualify and should have then told Seaward . Now that
evidence was never produced.
1 68
Where an expert CPA testified that it was his opinion that (1) the defendant
CPA's work failed to meet the reasonable standard of care, (2) the available re-
cords showed a substantial tax liability and (3) the discrepancy was so large that it
must have been an error instead of an estimating difference, it was error to grant
summary judgment for the accountant. 69
While the expert testimony must be precise to support a verdict, latitude is al-
lowed in qualifying the expert. The Eighth Circuit, applying Missouri law, re-
versed a summary judgment for an accounting firm on an embezzlement claim for
certain early years because of the erroneous disqualification of plaintiffs expert
witness.17 A retired professor, Howard Stettler, from the University of Kansas,
had taught for many years, but had worked only as a staff accountant at an auditing
firm for four years in the 1940's, had no experience auditing grain operations, had
never reviewed another auditor's work, and his license as a CPA expired in
1981. "' In reversing exclusion of the testimony the court noted that Rule 703172
allows experts to express their opinion on "facts or data ... perceived by or made
known to [them] at or before the hearing."1 73 The professor based his testimony on
facts supplied in an investigative report by Price Waterhouse, but he reached a
conclusion that differed from that of Price Waterhouse.1 74 In this same case, the
court upheld the exclusion of an expert whose affidavit contradicted his previous
sworn testimony. 175
2. Damages
Plaintiffs expert must develop the factual basis to support the theory that ac-
counting failures led to decisions or events that resulted in specific and reasonably
168. Id. at 287.
169. Wirtz v. Switzer & Switzer, Ltd., 586 So. 2d 775 (Miss. 1991).
170. Garnac Grain Co. v. Blackley, 932 F.2d 1563 (8th Cir. 1991).
171. Id. at 1567.
172. FED. R. EvID. 703.
173. Garnac, 932 F.2d at 1567.
174. Id. at 1567.
175. Id.
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certain damages. In Holland v. Arthur Anderson & Co. 176 the court upheld sum-
mary judgment for the accounting firm because the only damages claimed by the
trustee in bankruptcy were those of creditors. 177 The court conceded the validity of
the theory of deepening insolvency, but ruled that upon motion for summary judg-
ment it was too late for plaintiff to say it might be necessary to hire experts to de-
velop the damages. 
178
E. Attention to Details
Some appellate courts have overlooked serious errors in trial courts with the
statement that the error caused no harm. Counsel must be prepared to demonstrate
at each level the effect of improper rulings on the evidence.
Attention to such details enabled counsel for plaintiff to obtain reversal on ap-
peal in a Maryland case. 179 At trial counsel submitted this jury instruction:
(2) The client can rely on the accountant's knowledge and skill. It is not contribu-
torily negligent for a client to follow an accountant's instructions, or rely on his ad-
vice, or to fail to consult with another accountant or to discover the source of a
financial problem itself where the client has no reason to suspect his accountant's ad-
vice and instructions are wrong.180
In reversing a verdict for the accountant, the appeals court stressed that the fail-
ure to provide a focused instruction on relative duties may have caused the jury to
return the verdict for the accountant.181
F Demonstrating Effect of Errors
The Supreme Court of Montana termed it "harmless error" where the trial court
erred by instructing that violation of GAAP and GAAS was negligence per se. 
182
In another case, the court refused to overturn a verdict against an accounting firm
where the trial court erroneously refused to permit the accounting firm to use the
plaintiffs prior criminal conviction for impeachment of credibility.181 While
agreeing that the trial court committed error, the appellate court said "Peat failed
to show how this prejudiced the result."'" In Spitzer v. Haims and Company, 8 the
court refused to disturb a verdict for the accountant with the comment that any er-
ror on instructing the jury as to contributory negligence was harmless under the
general verdict rule.
176. 571 N.E.2d 777 (I11. App. Ct. 1991).
177. Id. at 778.
178. Id.
179. Howard St. Jewelers v. Wegad, 589 A.2d 1285 (Md. Ct. App. 1991).
180. Id. at 1287.
181. Id. at
182. Thayer v. Hicks, 793 P.2d 784 (Mont. 1990).
183. Bick v. Peat Marwick & Main, 799 P.2d 94 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990).
184. Id. at 104.
185. 587 A.2d 105 (Conn. 1991).
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G. Strategy Errors
In Bradford White v. Ernst & Whinney,'86 the court held the statute of limitations
defense was waived due to failure to call the matter up for hearing before trial. l87
Defense counsel argued in vain that the failure was an intentional part of strategy
of showing confidence in the defense position.
VII. CHARTING THE FUTURE: A PROPOSAL
Posner has proposed a general approach for evaluating laws in terms of provid-
ing incentives toward efficient behavior.'8 8 Others have examined the effects of le-
gal assessment of damages on distribution of costs and the ultimate effect on
conduct. 189
A. Efficient Conduct for Accountants
The efficiency of the accountant is increased in direct proportion to the ac-
countant's knowledge about the use of the accounting information and the plans of
persons expected to rely on the information. It is no accident that there have been
very few cases imposing liability on accountants under section I 1 of the Securities
Act. Accountants know in advance of particularized liability that will be imposed
in suits by purchasers of the newly registered security issue. It makes sense for
accountants to be more sensitive to this situation than to a situation where owner-
ship in the enterprise is to remain constant. To maximize efficiency for account-
ants, the law should impose less responsibility and liability when the accountant
knows less about the risk and the importance of the report and more responsibility
and liability when the accountant knows more about the risk and its relationship to
the report. The advance knowledge enables the accountant to adjust the fee and the
care in performance to the level demanded by the risk perceived.
B. Efficient Conduct and Society
At one end of the continuum is the third party who makes a bad economic deci-
sion without relying on the auditor's work. The law should avoid giving such per-
sons windfall gains at the auditor's expense. The goal of efficient behavior is best
served by placing upon this party the duty of conducting a careful investigation.
At the other end of the continuum, consider the third party, such as an investor
in all of the stock of the business, who makes a decision only after insisting on au-
dited financials which become a decisive factor. The auditor who undertakes to
prepare a report specifically for this party's reliance should owe a duty of due care.
Efficient behavior requires the auditor engaged for this particular purpose to take
reasonable steps for the relying party's benefit.
186. Bradford White v. Ernst & Whinney, 872 F2d 1153 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 993 (1989).
187. Id.
188. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 65 (3d ed. 1986).
189. GuiDo CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970); Christopher D. Stone, The Place ofEnterprise Liabil-
ity in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90 YALE L.J. 1 (1980).
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In the middle of the continuum are third parties who lack the bargaining power
to require all the information that might be relevant, and who find it impractical to
contract with an auditor for the exercise of due care. This includes many trade
creditors and investors. In these situations liability should appropriately be limited
in relation to the nexus or proximity of the auditor to the actor and to the loss trans-
action. Banks and large lenders such as insurance companies have the bargaining
power to require production of the relevant information for their needs. In the in-
terest of efficient behavior they should be expected to exercise this power in con-
ducting their own investigations. The auditor's duty of due care should be
conditioned first on requiring exercise of due care by such plaintiffs and secondly
on an evaluation of the nexus between the accountant, the plaintiff, and the loss
transaction.
Efficient behavior can be fostered by more informative disclosures concerning
the results of billions of dollars of investigative processes conducted by auditors.
Auditors should report on the relative financial strength and the relative earnings
of each firm in terms of the particular industry and evaluate the cost effectiveness
of the audit client's internal control structure. In order to meet the challenge of
more effective performance, the accounting profession must enforce stricter
standards of independence by requiring public companies to designate an audit
committee composed of outside directors to take charge of all hiring and firing of
auditors. This must be accompanied by reforms that require democratic processes
and reasonable conditions of employment in the management of all accounting
firms serving public companies and the elimination of hiring of client family
members, leasing of offices from clients and performing consulting services for
audit clients. Only when these reforms are in place can the accounting profession
meet the challenge of fostering more efficient behavior.
By becoming more aware of these issues, the courts can become an instrument
for bringing about the needed social changes. Reduction in the diversity of results
in various jurisdictions can lead to less forum shopping,19 more efficient behav-
ior, and in adjusting risks to auditors in proportion to social costs of audit failures.
If society needs greater assurance as to the audit of financial institutions, this in-
formation can be communicated to auditors in terms of specific legislation that
raises the standard of care for financial institution audits. The result will be a safer
banking system in the context of more efficient behavior by accountants.
190. In Gruber v. Price Waterhouse, 117 F.R.D. 75 (E.D. Pa. 1987), the choice of law problem for common
law claims was resolved by the court's conclusion that the law of the forum state should govern common law
claims of the entire class.
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